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Risk factors for communicable diseases in humanitarian emergencies and 
disasters: Results from a three-stage expert elicitation 
 
Abstract 
Background: Humanitarian emergencies including disasters associated with natural hazards, 
conflict, complex emergencies and famines can pose significant risks to public health, 
especially when they lead to population displacement into inadequate conditions. To reduce 
the risk of communicable disease outbreaks in such situations it is necessary to know the key 
risk factors, their thresholds (quantitative risk factors only) and their relative importance in 
different types of emergencies. 
Methods: We conducted a three-stage structured expert elicitation. Experts from the fields of 
health protection and humanitarian assistance were invited to complete three successive 
online questionnaires. Experts were asked to choose the 20 most critical risk factors and in 
subsequent rounds to determine thresholds for urgent (yellow threshold level) and critical 
action (red threshold level). Additionally, experts were asked to assign weights for the risk 
factors in different emergency types.   
Results: We identified 20 key risk factors, which include factors related to water, sanitation 
and hygiene, access to health care, vaccination, nutrition, political will and others. Nine out 
of the 20 risk factors were quantifiable, for those risk factors yellow and red thresholds are 
given. 11 risk factors were qualitative. All risk factors scored highly when weighted in 
different emergency types and differences between risk factor weights in different types of 
emergencies were limited. 
Conclusion: Communicable disease risks in humanitarian emergencies are a nexus of 
complex and often interrelated individual issues. Knowing key risk factors and their 
thresholds and weight in different types of emergencies can help guide emergency response 
and risk reduction efforts. 
 




Communicable diseases are one of the primary concerns in humanitarian emergencies and 
disasters. (1-20) Humanitarian emergencies include disasters associated with natural hazards 
(such as earthquakes, floods and tsunamis), and man-made disasters such as famine, conflict 
and complex emergencies. These emergencies usually require a large-scale (international) 
response and affect large proportions of a community, country or region. The importance and 
overall risk of communicable diseases and communicable disease outbreaks differs between 
different disaster types.  It is particularly low in geo-disasters such as earthquakes or volcanic 
eruptions (21), higher for flooding (14-20), and much worse again in refugee crises (2, 4-8, 
10-12, 22) or complex humanitarian emergencies (1, 23).  
While the problem of a potentially increased risk of communicable diseases in humanitarian 
emergencies is well documented, information on specific risk factors and the levels at which 
these risk factors become critical is lacking. Yet, the identification of risk factors and their 
interaction is crucial for risk management. Knowing the overall risk profiles can help identify 
those sites where proactive interventions may reduce the impact of communicable diseases.  
Key risk factors communicable diseases identified in the academic literature can be broadly 
grouped into categories such as Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), health and public 
health system, environment, humanitarian response, infrastructure, insecurity, living 
conditions, nutrition, mass population displacement, and economy. (23) Within those broader 
categories individual risk factors are defined more specifically, while the categories 
themselves serve as general risk factors as well. (1, 2, 23-33) While for all emergency types 
similar groups of risk factors have been identified as of significance, their weight can be 
different depending on the individual setting as does the overall risk of a communicable 
disease outbreak, which is, as Floret et al. (21) noted, almost negligible in geo-disasters that 
do not trigger a secondary disaster such as displacement crisis.  For each site, it is also 
important to know which risk factors are of the most pressing concern to allocate resources 
correctly and prioritise interventions. 
In this paper, we summarise the results from three stages of structured online expert 
consultations we performed to determine the 20 most critical risk factors (across all types of 
humanitarian emergencies), their thresholds for those factors that could be assessed by a 
quantitative indicator and their weights in different types of emergencies. These data were 
later used as the basis for the development of a rapid risk assessment tool useful for non-
experts to assess needs and priorities in humanitarian emergencies.  The factors selected to be 
among the 20 most critical were included in the tool and the thresholds and weights for each 
factor were used as the basis for a risk score for each factor and a combined overall risk 
score. The risk factors identified, their weights and thresholds, and especially the rapid risk 
assessment tool build based on them does in no way substitute detailed needs assessment and 
is designed to rapidly assess communicable disease outbreak risk and as such is not a suitable 
basis for humanitarian programming. 
 
2. Methods 
We conducted a three-stage structured expert elicitation.  
Recruitment and participants: Participants who self-identified as having experience in health 
protection and/or humanitarian assistance were invited to take part. Participants were 
recruited by email through dedicated listservs that cover areas such as health protection, 
public health intelligence, humanitarian assistance and disaster studies as well as through the 
personal and professional contacts of the research team. Participants were then guided to an 
online questionnaire. 
Recruitment included personalised emails to 16 individuals we knew professionally, and via 
dedicated relevant listservs.  Recipients were encouraged to share with interested colleagues.  
Most of the targeted individual recipients had recent field experience supporting response to 
humanitarian disasters.  Table M1 lists the affiliations of targeted individuals and the specific 
list serves; most affiliations were with public health agencies, charitable aid organisations 
and/or research institutions. Many targeted respondents had multiple relevant affiliations.  To 
help assure confidentiality we did not ask during the survey for identifying information such 
as current employer, job title or years of experience.  The specific Email listservs we used 
and characteristics of the individuals we personally asked to fill in the survey are listed in 
Table 1. 
 
Table M1 Email list servers (n=11), and with affiliations and characteristics of targeted 
individuals (n=16) 
 
Public Health Agencies:    
Philippine Ministry of Health, Public Health England, World Health Organisation, Unicef, 
UNESCO, UNRWA 
   
NGOs involved with Humanitarian response:  
Global Student Embassy, Médecins Sans Frontières, Mercy Corps Indonesia 
   
Universities or Research Institutions:   
Adnan Menderes Üniversitesi, Institute of Tropical Medicine in Antwerp, Northumbria 
University, Tufts University, University of East Anglia, Würzburg University 
   
Job titles of targeted individuals:   
Associate Professor, Consultant for WHO, Consultant in Global Disaster Risk Reduction, 
Director of Health programme, Director of Operations Research, Geostatistical Modeller, 
Operations Researcher, Professor, Research Fellow, Researcher, Senior Fellow, WASH 
cluster coordinator, Water Coordinator, Water Hygiene and Sanitation Officer 
   
Email List servers   
German Disaster Research Listserv JISCMAIL Health Geography Listserv 
Healthcare Information for All listserv JISCMAIL Public Health Listserv 
JISCMAIL Medical Sociology Listserv JISCMAIL Disaster Research Listserv 
JISCMAIL Disaster Research Listserv JISCMAIL Global Health Listserv 
JISCMAIL Public Health Listserv Humanitarian Listserv 
Society of Apothecaries Healthcare Information for All listserv 
 
Responses: The first questionnaire was completed by 21 participants; the second 
questionnaire was completed by 24 and the last questionnaire by 25 persons. We only stored, 
recorded, and analysed completed questionnaires and not those left half-completed in order to 
comply with the possibility for participants to withdraw consent to partake until the end of 
the survey. Given that the surveys were advertised widely, this represents a relatively small 
proportion of possible respondents. However, it is not possible to characterise the actual 
response rate. 
Questionnaires are included in the supplemental files. Participants could fill out one or more 
of the three stages of online questionnaires.  Participation in a previous questionnaire was not 
required to take part in the second and/or third stages. The first questionnaire asked 
participants to identify the 20 most critical risk factors from a list compiled based on the 
wider literature (23), and a recent literature review by the research team. (23) The first 
questionnaire also asked participants to assign weights (on a scale from 0-5) to each risk 
factor to allow the calculation of a weighted average for each factor. The weighted average 
was calculated from the mean score of level of importance (on a scale from 0-5) times the 
number of participants selecting this weight for this factor. Weighted averages were 
calculated in case the initial mechanism for selection the 20 most critical factors based on 
how many participants considered them to be in the top-20 proved to be inconclusive. In the 
second questionnaire, participants were invited to assign yellow (urgent, action required) and 
red (critical, action required immediately) thresholds for all quantifiable risk factors. The 
final questionnaire asked participants to assign weights (on a scale from 1 to 5) for all risk 
factors in nine different types of humanitarian emergencies. 
The third and final questionnaire sought to identify the respective weights of the 20 most 
critical risk factors in nine different types of emergencies, as broadly described by Spens and 
Kovács. (34) The types of crises were: famine (F), complex emergency (CHE), conflict (C), 
refugee and IDP camp (RC), flooding (FL), geo-disaster (GD), protracted crisis (PC), tropical 
storm (TC) and tsunami (T). Complex emergencies describe situations in which widespread 
internal or external conflict has led to a complete breakdown of authority and widespread 
damage to society.  They are defined by requiring a multi-facetted, multi-agency international 
response (23, 35).  Conflicts include inter- and intro-state warfare, civil war and insurgency . 
Geo-disasters include earthquake, landslides, volcanic eruptions and other disasters caused by 
geological hazards. Flooding refers to fresh water flooding. Tropic storms include 
Hurricanes, Typhoons, Cyclones and similar hydro-meteorological hazards.  This list of types 
of emergencies was not meant to be complete or to comprise mutually exclusive types of 
crises. Especially displacement crises are usually an additional humanitarian emergency 
secondary to conflicts, complex emergencies, or disasters associated with a natural hazard. 
However, we believe the risks for communicable disease outbreaks differ significantly 
enough for these to form distinct categories. 
 
Analysis: Answers were collected online and analysed in Microsoft Excel. Weighted 
averages, median and mean scores were calculated where appropriate. Additionally, 




The first questionnaire was completed by 21 participants; the second questionnaire was 
completed by 24 and the last questionnaire by 25 persons. We only stored, recorded, and 
analysed completed questionnaires and not those left half-completed in order to comply with 
the possibility for participants to withdraw consent to partake until the end of the survey. 
Given that the surveys were advertised widely, this represents a relatively small proportion of 




The first questionnaire sought to identify the 20 most critical risk factors, irrespective of the 
emergency type and their relative importance. The 20 risk factors chosen by the most 
respondents (see column ‘Selected (n)’ in Table 2) were input to the Stage 2 and 3 surveys.  
19/20 of these also had the overall highest weighted average scores (see Table 3).  
 




No access to clean water 90.48 19 Yes 
Lack of functioning toilets 90.48 19 Yes 
Exposure to disease vectors 80.95 17 Yes 
Lack of waste management 80.95 17 Yes 
Lack of health facilities 76.19 16 Yes 
Lack of health professionals (doctors, nurses, 
community health workers) 
76.19 16 Yes 
Insufficient vaccination coverage 71.43 15 Yes 
Poor health status of the population 71.43 15 Yes 
Extreme poverty 71.43 15 Yes 
Overcrowding 66.67 14 Yes 
Lack of medicines 57.14 12 Yes 
Insufficient nutrient intake 52.38 11 Yes 
Lack of health education 52.38 11 Yes 
Inadequate distance between housing etc. and 
human waste disposal 
52.38 11 Yes 
Ongoing conflict 52.38 11 Yes 
Population displacement 52.38 11 Yes 
Lack of organisational and political will to 
address public health problems 
52.38 11 Yes 
Flooding (waste water) 47.62 10 Yes 
Breakdown of government services 47.62 10 Yes 
Reluctance to follow recommended procedures 
to limit disease spread 
47.62 10 Yes 
Lack of disease surveillance 42.86 9 No 
Inadequate shelter 42.86 9 No 
No soap 38.10 8 No 
Local endemicity of key communicable 
diseases 
38.10 8 No 
Lack of trust in health care provided 33.33 7 No 
Flooding (fresh water) 33.33 7 No 
Environmental vulnerability 33.33 7 No 
Local endemicity of disease vectors 33.33 7 No 
Inequalities 33.33 7 No 
Political instability 33.33 7 No 
Lack of electricity 28.57 6 No 
Illiteracy (among target recipients of aid) 28.57 6 No 
Unsafe burial rites 23.81 5 No 
Breakdown of authority 23.81 5 No 
Displacement into camp(s) 23.81 5 No 
Low levels of education (among target 
population) 
23.81 5 No 
Indoor fires/air pollution 19.05 4 No 
Sexual and Gender-based Violence 19.05 4 No 
Increased contact with domestic animals 14.29 3 No 
Flooding (sea water) 14.29 3 No 
Very high temperatures 14.29 3 No 
Lack of belief in germ model – preference for 
other explanations of diseases 
14.29 3 No 
Ethnic rivalry 9.52 2 No 
Seismic risk (dry mass displacement) 9.52 2 No 
Landslide risk (wet mass displacement) 9.52 2 No 
High precipitation 9.52 2 No 
Very low temperatures 9.52 2 No 
Violence 9.52 2 No 
Increased contact with wildlife 4.76 1 No 
Temporary housing (not tents) 4.76 1 No 
Drought 4.76 1 No 
Dust storms 4.76 1 No 
De-forestation 4.76 1 No 
Economic stagnation 4.76 1 No 
Competition for resources 4.76 1 No 
Arms proliferation 4.76 1 No 
Lack of fuel for cooking or heating 4.76 1 No 
Housing in tents 0 0 No 
Volcanic risk 0 0 No 
Table 2: List of the selected 20 most critical risk factors irrespective of emergency type and setting. 
Participants (n=21) were asked to select 20 factors out of the given 59 options. 
 





No access to clean water 2 0 0 0 3 1
5 
4.35 Yes 
Lack of functioning toilets 2 0 2 1 8 7 3.7 Yes 
Lack of health facilities 5 0 1 0 7 7 3.25 Yes 
Lack of health professionals 
(doctors, nurses, community health 
workers) 
5 0 1 2 3 9 3.25 Yes 
Extreme poverty 5 0 1 3 4 7 3.1 Yes 
Insufficient vaccination coverage 6 0 1 3 3 7 2.9 Yes 
Exposure to disease vectors 4 0 4 3 4 5 2.9 Yes 
Lack of waste management 4 0 1 6 7 2 2.9 Yes 
Poor health status of the population 6 0 0 4 8 2 2.7 Yes 
Lack of medicines 9 0 0 2 4 5 2.35 Yes 
Overcrowding 7 0 2 4 7 0 2.2 Yes 
Ongoing conflict 10 0 0 3 3 4 2.05 Yes 
Lack of organisational or political 
will to address public health 
problems 
9 0 2 3 2 4 2.05 Yes 
Insufficient nutrient intake 9 0 2 2 5 2 2 Yes 
Inadequate distance between 
housing, etc. and human waste 
disposal 
9 0 1 3 7 0 1.95 Yes 
Flooding (waste-water) 11 0 0 1 5 3 1.9 Yes 
Lack of health education 9 0 1 6 3 1 1.85 Yes 
Population displacement 10 0 2 0 7 1 1.85 Yes 
Breakdown of government services 10 1 2 2 2 3 1.7 Yes 
Inadequate shelter 11 0 2 3 1 3 1.6 No 
Inequalities 13 0 0 0 5 2 1.5 No 
No soap 13 0 1 0 3 3 1.45 No 
Lack of disease surveillance 12 0 1 3 3 1 1.4 No 
Reluctance to follow recommended 
procedures to limit disease spread 
11 0 2 4 3 0 1.4 Yes 
Political instability 13 0 1 1 3 2 1.35 No 
Local endemicity of key 
communicable diseases 
13 0 1 2 3 1 1.25 No 
Flooding (fresh water) 13 0 1 2 4 0 1.2 No 
Local endemicity of disease vectors 14 0 1 1 1 3 1.2 No 
Environmental vulnerability 13 0 2 2 2 1 1.15 No 
Lack of electricity 14 0 1 2 2 1 1.05 No 
Breakdown of authority 15 0 0 1 2 2 1.05 No 
Lack of trust in health care provided 14 0 0 4 2 0 1 No 
Illiteracy (among target recipients of 
aid) 
14 0 1 3 1 1 1 No 
Displacement into camp 5 0 1 1 2 1 0.9 No 
Low levels of education (among 
target persons) 
15 0 0 3 1 1 0.9 No 
Sexual and Gender-based Violence 16 0 0 1 2 1 0.8 No 
Indoor fires/indoor air pollution 16 0 0 2 1 1 0.75 No 
Increased contact with domestic 
animals 
17 0 0 1 2 0 0.55 No 
Unsafe burial rites 16 0 2 1 1 0 0.55 No 
Ethnic rivalry 18 0 0 0 1 1 0.45 No 
Flooding (salt-water) 17 0 1 1 1 0 0.45 No 
Very high temperatures 17 0 0 3 0 0 0.45 No 
Lack of belief in germ model – 
preference for other explanations for 
disease causes 
17 0 1 1 1 0 0.45 No 
Violence 18 0 0 1 0 1 0.4 No 
Seismic risk (dry mass displacement) 18 0 1 0 0 1 0.35 No 
Very low temperatures 18 0 0 1 1 0 0.35 No 
Increased contact with wildlife 19 0 0 0 0 1 0.25 No 
Landslide risk (wet mass 
displacement) 
18 0 1 1 0 0 0.25 No 
High precipitation 18 0 1 1 0 0 0.25 No 
Drought 19 0 0 0 0 1 0.25 No 
Economic stagnation 19 0 0 0 0 1 0.25 No 
Arms proliferation 19 0 0 0 0 1 0.25 No 
Dust storms 19 0 0 0 1 0 0.2 No 
De-forestation 19 0 0 0 1 0 0.2 No 
Lack of fuel for cooking or heating 19 0 0 0 1 0 0.2 No 
Temporary housing (not tents) 19 0 1 0 0 0 0.1 No 
Competition for resources 19 0 1 0 0 0 0.1 No 
Housing in tents 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 No 
Volcanic risk 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 No 
Table 3: Weighted averages of the importance of the risk factors in humanitarian emergencies and disasters, 
irrespective of emergency type and setting. 0= Not selected/not important; 1= A little important; 2= Important; 
3= Quite important; 4= Very important; 5= Extremely important.  Green indicates those factors included in 
stages 2 and 3 while the factors marked in red were discarded after stage 1.  
 
Thresholds 
Table 4 shows the expert-identified yellow and red thresholds for the nine quantifiable risk 
factors. A yellow threshold indicated a situation of concern that should be addressed as soon 
as possible while a red threshold indicated a highly critical situation that needs to be a top 
priority. These thresholds are described individually below. 
 
    MIN MAX MEDIA
N 
MEAN SD n 




0.00 30.00 6.50 10.50 8.92 16 
Red 0.00 15.00 2.00 5.25 5.01 20 




5.00 200.00 20.00 45.00 54.70 13 
Red 1.00 100.00 5.00 18.77 27.28 13 




1.00 50.00 9.00 10.86 11.74 14 
Red 1.00 20.00 4.00 4.92 4.95 13 
Doctors per 10 000 persons Yello
w 
1.00 200.00 5.00 27.31 55.97 13 
Red 0.00 100.00 1.50 19.21 35.24 14 
Nurses per 10 000 persons Yello
w 








CHW per 10 000 persons Yello
w 
1.00 200.00 20.00 42.46 55.51 13 





40.00 95.00 90.00 81.92 14.88 13 





10.00 90.00 80.00 73.08 21.53 13 
Red 1.00 85.00 72.50 62.21 23.92 14 
Polio vaccination percentage Yello
w 
45.00 95.00 87.50 83.33 12.80 12 
Red 1.00 90.00 75.00 64.31 25.89 13 




20.00 90.00 72.50 70.83 17.42 12 
Red 1.00 90.00 50.00 52.00 23.90 13 




1.00 60.00 20.00 28.27 22.88 11 
Red 1.00 80.00 20.00 29.07 25.70 14 
Persons per 100 square meters Yello
w 
1.00 50.00 5.00 13.09 14.53 11 
Red 1.00 75.00 10.00 20.58 22.28 12 


















Distance housing and human 
waste disposal (meters) 
Yello
w 
10.00 300.00 50.00 79.00 89.60 10 
Red 1.00 500.00 20.00 71.00 138.5
3 
11 
Table4: Summary of yellow and red thresholds for 9 quantifiable risk factors.  
 
Access to clean water 
Access to clean water was measured in litre per person per day. The median red threshold 
was 2 (mean 5.25, SD 5.01) litres and the median yellow threshold 6.5 (mean 10.5, SD 8.92) 
litres.  
Health care facilities 
The available number of hospital beds per 10,000 persons was used as a proxy indicator for 
the risk factor health care facilities. The median red threshold was 5 beds (mean 18.77, SD 
27.28) per 10,000 persons and the median yellow threshold was 20 beds (mean 45, SD 54.70) 
per 10,000 persons. 
Functioning toilets 
The median red threshold for functioning toilets was 4 (mean 4.92, SD 4.95) toilets per 100 
persons and the median yellow threshold was 9 (mean 10.86, SSD 11.74) toilets per 100 
persons. 
Health professionals 
The number of health professionals per 10000 was measured in three categories. The median 
red threshold for doctors per 10000 persons was 1.5 (mean 19.21, SD 35.24) and the median 
yellow threshold was 5 (mean 27.31, SD 55.91) doctors per 10000 persons. The median red 
threshold for nurses was 6 (mean 96.79, SD 256.24) per 10000 persons and the median 
yellow threshold 10 (mean 63, SD 111.29) nurses per 10000 persons. The median red 
threshold for community health care workers was 8.5 (mean 15.86, SD 26.18) per 10000 
persons and the median yellow threshold was 20 (mean 42.46, SD 55.51) community health 
care workers per 10000 persons. 
Vaccination coverage 
Vaccination coverage was measured for the following five diseases: measles, meningococcal 
meningitis, polio and hepatitis B. The median red threshold for measles vaccination coverage 
was 75 % (mean 67.21, SD 23.46) and the median yellow threshold was 90 % (mean 81.92, 
SD 14.88). The median red threshold for meningococcal meningitis vaccination coverage was 
72.5 % (mean 62.21, SD 23.92) with a median yellow threshold at 80 % (mean 73.08, SD 
21.53). The median red threshold for polio vaccination coverage was 75 (mean 64.31, SD 
25.89) percent with a median yellow threshold of 87.5 % (mean 83.33, SD 12.80). The 
median red threshold for Hepatitis B vaccination coverage was 50 % (mean 52.00, SD 23.90) 
with a median yellow threshold of 72.5 % (mean 70.83, SD 17.42). 
Poverty 
Poverty was measured in percentage of the population living below 1 $ US per person per 
day. The median red threshold was 20 % (mean 29.07, SD 25.70) and the median yellow 
threshold was also 20 % (mean 28.27, SD 22.88). 
Overcrowding 
Overcrowding was measured in the number of persons living per 100 square metres. The 
median red threshold was 10 (mean 20.58, SD 22.28) persons per 100 m2 and the median 
yellow threshold was 5 (mean 13.09, SD 14.53) persons per 100 m2. 
Nutrition 
Nutrition was measured in kcal per adult per day. The median red threshold was 1000 (mean 
1009.30, SD 742.52) and the median yellow threshold was 1750 (mean 1716.67, SD 692.62) 
kcal per adult per day. These figures – especially the seemingly ‘high’ figure for the yellow 
threshold must be understood in the context of the impact of mal- and undernutrition for the 
severity of communicable disease outbreaks through mechanisms such as increased 
susceptibility and greater shedding and transmission. Poor nutritional status is a common 
attribute of affected populations in many humanitarian emergencies, and is known to 
exacerbate the size and severity of communicable disease outbreaks. (1, 24, 36-38) 
Distance between human waste disposal and housing 
The median red threshold for the distance between human waste disposal and housing was 20 
m (mean 71.00, SD 138.53) and the median yellow threshold was 50 m (mean 79, SD 89.60). 
 
Weights in different emergency types 
Weights for the different risk factors found by the third and final questionnaire were similar 
for different types of emergencies, with only minor differences (see figure 1 and tables 5 and 
6). On a scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important) all included risk factors score 
above 4 (both mean and median) when combining all emergencies. The only two risk factors 
with a median of 3 were ‘insufficient nutrient intake’ and ‘lack of health education’ in the 
context of a tropical storm. Mean values for all risk factors in all different emergency types 
(not combined) remained above 3.4, except for ‘lack of health education’ in the context of 
flooding (mean 3.29, SD 1.14, median 4) and ‘lack of health education’ in the context of a 
tropical storm (mean 3.22, SD 1.28, median 3). This suggests a reinforcement of the 
importance of these risk factors across different humanitarian emergency types.  
There was considerable correlation between risk factors, demonstrating the highly interactive 
nature of risk and risk factors in humanitarian emergencies as well as the complexity of such 
situations (see table 5).  
 




F CHE C F GD PC RC TS T 
No access to clean water 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Lack of functioning toilets 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Exposure to disease vectors 4.5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Lack of waste management 4 4 4 4.5 4 5 5 4 4 
Lack of health facilities 4.5 5 5 4.5 5 5 5 5 5 
Lack of health workers 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 
Insufficient vaccine coverage 4.5 4 4 4 4 4.5 5 4 4 
Poor health status 5 5 4.5 4 4 5 4.5 4 4 
Extreme poverty 4.5 4 4 4 4 5 4.5 4.5 4 
Overcrowding 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 
Lack of medicines 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 
Insufficient nutrient intake 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 3 4 
Lack of health education 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 
Inadequate distance between housing 
and human waste disposal 
4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 
Ongoing conflict 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 
Population displacement 4.5 4 5 4.5 4 5 5 4.5 4 
Lack of organisational and/or political 
will to address public health problems 
5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 
Flooding (waste water) 4 4 4 5 4 4.5 4 5 5 
Breakdown of government services 5 4 5 4.5 4 5 4.5 4 4 
Reluctance to follow disease control 
procedures 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4.5 4 4 
Table 5: Median values for the weights of the selected risk factors in different types of emergencies  
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Table 6: Mean values for the weights for the risk factors in different emergency types (standard deviations in 
brackets). 
W = Water; T = Toilets; V = Vectors; WM = Waste Management; HF = Health Facilities; HC = Health Care Workers; VA = Vaccinations; HS = Health Status; P = Poverty; O = Overcrowding; M = Medicines; N = Nutrition; HE = 
Health Education; D = Distance between housing and human waste disposal; C = Conflict; DI = Displacement; W = Will to address problems; F = Flooding (waste water); B = Breakdown of government services; R = 
Reluctance to follow procedures 
PC = Pearson Correlation 
  W T V WM HF HC VA HS P O M N HE D C DI W F B R 
W PC 1 .522** .350** .314** .378** .306** .301** .262** .280** .310** .354** .337** .204* .336** .309** .329** .368** .363** .243** .405** 
T PC .522** 1 .463** .692** .486** .361** .357** .297** .293** .554** .482** .297** .388** .586** .400** .406** .427** .622** .367** .519** 
V PC .350** .463** 1 .507** .547** .507** .584** .420** .441** .467** .509** .423** .337** .415** .469** .474** .432** .374** .401** .592** 
WM PC .314** .692** .507** 1 .566** .447** .384** .313** .311** .539** .632** .260** .523** .623** .359** .445** .485** .495** .467** .490** 
HF PC .378** .486** .547** .566** 1 .874** .540** .453** .397** .492** .796** .432** .485** .531** .545** .500** .562** .394** .522** .549** 
HC PC .306** .361** .507** .447** .874** 1 .539** .508** .513** .484** .737** .452** .482** .467** .560** .531** .612** .289** .605** .525** 
VA PC .301** .357** .584** .384** .540** .539** 1 .611** .570** .422** .547** .525** .555** .376** .565** .519** .503** .246** .423** .628** 
HS PC .262** .297** .420** .313** .453** .508** .611** 1 .796** .544** .504** .744** .530** .301** .559** .476** .453** .193** .418** .441** 
P PC .280** .293** .441** .311** .397** .513** .570** .796** 1 .644** .449** .633** .479** .312** .593** .592** .539** .244** .553** .478** 
O PC .310** .554** .467** .539** .492** .484** .422** .544** .644** 1 .511** .503** .517** .426** .503** .524** .549** .368** .485** .475** 
M PC .354** .482** .509** .632** .796** .737** .547** .504** .449** .511** 1 .485** .619** .584** .551** .542** .642** .450** .583** .589** 
N PC .337** .297** .423** .260** .432** .452** .525** .744** .633** .503** .485** 1 .473** .399** .526** .388** .411** .192* .335** .408** 
HE PC .204* .388** .337** .523** .485** .482** .555** .530** .479** .517** .619** .473** 1 .428** .484** .406** .463** .290** .389** .503** 
D PC .336** .586** .415** .623** .531** .467** .376** .301** .312** .426** .584** .399** .428** 1 .438** .352** .370** .629** .365** .620** 
C PC .309** .400** .469** .359** .545** .560** .565** .559** .593** .503** .551** .526** .484** .438** 1 .610** .572** .271** .509** .528** 
DI PC .329** .406** .474** .445** .500** .531** .519** .476** .592** .524** .542** .388** .406** .352** .610** 1 .642** .417** .598** .531** 
W PC .368** .427** .432** .485** .562** .612** .503** .453** .539** .549** .642** .411** .463** .370** .572** .642** 1 .368** .828** .558** 
F PC .363** .622** .374** .495** .394** .289** .246** .193** .244** .368** .450** .192* .290** .629** .271** .417** .368** 1 .340** .547** 
B PC .243** .367** .401** .467** .522** .605** .423** .418** .553** .485** .583** .335** .389** .365** .509** .598** .828** .340** 1 .464** 
R PC .405** .519** .592** .490** .549** .525** .628** .441** .478** .475** .589** .408** .503** .620** .528** .531** .558** .547** .464** 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)  **. Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed) 
Table 7: Correlation between risk factors (all emergency types combined) 
4. Discussion 
The results from the first questionnaire, regarding the selection of risk factors, confirm that, 
as suggested in wider literature, WASH (39-42), health care (36, 43), nutrition (1, 36, 37) and 
emergency specific risk factors such as poverty (44-46), displacement and overcrowding (1, 
24, 28, 47), and (ongoing) armed conflict or war (48) are among the primary factors 
influencing communicable disease outbreaks in humanitarian emergencies and disasters. 
These results are further confirmed by the outcomes of the third questionnaire which 
indicates the high importance of the selected risk factors across all types of humanitarian 
emergencies. While some of the risk factors identified in this research were – deliberately – 
broad, additional discussion with humanitarian aid providers (which were not strictly 
speaking part of this research) revealed some of the most common interpretations of these 
risk factors and showed that while encompassing a range of issues they were interpreted 
similarly by all people we spoke to. For example, ‘breakdown of government services’ was 
generally interpreted as encompassing wider infrastructure issues such as transportation and 
roads, telecommunications, safety and security, and sometimes education. Many of these 
have complex interaction pathways. (23)  
For some of the risk factors responses included seemingly extreme values. Due to this we 
suggest for any use of the data to rely on median values rather than means to make sure that 
extremes have little effect. However, we are not confident enough that they are simply 
mistakes to omit them from the analysis. Extremes of 1 or 0 could also mean that the 
responder didn’t think this was a relevant factor. We cannot know why such a value was 
selected, if such values had been mentioned in interviews, it would have been highly 
interesting to know if this was a mistake or an intentional way to signify that a risk factor or 
threshold would – in the responder’s opinion – not have significant effect on communicable 
disease outbreak risk. 
While we focused on the 20 most critical risk factors, this does not mean that other factors are 
not important when assessing the risk of communicable disease outbreaks in such situations.  
However, our aim was to establish which factors need to be priority concerns.  We were 
interested in identifying thresholds for the risk factors could be that could support quick 
assessment using minimal resources and man-power.  
The argument could be raised, that thresholds for many of these factors can be as easily 
obtained from the Sphere standards. (49) However, the thresholds listed in the Sphere 
standards have important limitations if used for the purpose of assessing the risk of 
communicable disease outbreaks in humanitarian emergencies.  The Sphere standards were 
developed to assess the adequacy of overall humanitarian response and provide general 
minimum standards.  Thus, the Sphere standards are neither intended as risk assessment nor 
are they specific to communicable diseases.  Secondly, the Sphere standards have a 
normative component, they indicate standards that should be reach based on ethical 
considerations rather than those that empirically relate to changes in the level of risk 
experience. While this makes the Sphere standards an unsuitable comparison, it might be 
interesting to see how this difference in approach shapes the suggested thresholds. Sphere 
standards indicate a minimum of 15 litres of water per person per day. (49) Or survey found a 
yellow threshold for clean water availability at 6.5 litres per person per day. This difference is 
explained by the fact that the thresholds we sought to identify are only thresholds for 
increases in disease outbreak risk. A yellow threshold for clean water at 6.5 litres per person 
per day does not suggest that a person does not need more that 6.5 litres of water per day but 
rather that below that the risk for a communicable disease outbreak critically increases. 
Additionally, some of the risk factors and especially their measurements are simply proxies. 
This becomes clear when looking at vaccination coverage. The selected vaccines are not 
meant to be the main, the only, or even vaccination priorities at all in all emergencies but 
rather they are used as proxies to estimate the reach of vaccination programmes. 
Keeping this in mind, the measures and risk factors identified are entirely unsuitable to base 
humanitarian programming upon. This should follow a suitable method for needs assessment 
– which obviously communicable disease outbreak risk assessment, which the factors 
suggested here are meant for, is not – and an estimation of minimum standards based on 
internationally accepted levels such as the Sphere standards. 
In contrast, the thresholds identified by our surveys indicate precise and transferable tipping 
points for levels of risk.  They are the first step towards developing a rapid risk assessment 
mechanism for communicable disease outbreaks in humanitarian emergencies that, rather 
than asking the person or persons completing it for qualitative and personal assessments of 
the severity without any indicators what this should be based on, uses pre-defined thresholds 
and risk levels against which a situation can be judged. Hence our thresholds are hopefully 
useful in real world risk assessment, because they identify specific risk thresholds using 
simple quantitative indicators. 
Limitations 
While we made every attempt to maximise participation, the main limitation of this work is 
the small number of respondents. However, it can be argued that the field of experts suitable 
for participation is not large.  Our expert opinions are in line with assessments in scientific 
literature of the relative importance of different risk factors (see literature referenced at start 
of discussion section). Generally speaking, expert elicitations have their limits and are subject 
to biases. (50, 51) Overconfidence in the results of expert elicitations should be avoided. (51) 
Hence, we do not recommend accepting the results without further inquiry even if they are 
mostly in line with the literature. 
Additionally, the above-mentioned lack of specification and possibly blurred and broad 
definitions of some of the risk factors can be seen as a limitation. That would certainly be the 
case of the results from this research would be used uncritically to make decisions in the 
field, even if they were used just for risk assessment without further additional investigation. 
However, considering that we do not recommend using these results beyond the realm of risk 
assessment and that for risk assessment we considered this research to be a first stage within a 
much larger research project, the results form a good starting point to understand expert 




Communicable disease outbreaks remain a significant concern in the aftermath of 
emergencies and disasters, especially in low and middle income countries.  Broadly, expert 
consensus seems to be that WASH, access to healthcare, nutrition and wider societal and 
emergency specific factors are among the most important indicators and risk factors for 
communicable disease outbreaks in such situations. These factors remain important across 
different types of humanitarian emergencies. Beyond establishing current expert opinion this 
research also serves as a starting point to assess and improve risk assessment tools, methods 
and protocols for communicable disease risks in humanitarian emergencies and disasters. 
Current risk assessment tools – such as the WHO tool used in the context of the EWARN 
system (52, 53) – also use individual risk factors.  But there is a strong need to make risk 
assessments clearer and more explicit by using – where possible – previously determined risk 
factor thresholds that can be assessed without expert knowledge in each domain.  Ideally, this 
risk summary would be based on an independent needs assessment and require minimal 
additional primary data collection in the field. The expert consultation described in this 
article, combined with a systematic review performed in parallel (23) and additional research 
by the research team, seeks to be the basis for such a pragmatic, easy-to-use and novel risk 
assessment tool. While no system captures the complexity and diversity of humanitarian 
emergency settings perfectly and even accepted international standard such as Sphere are 
under constant revision and do not cover all aspects of humanitarian response, such a risk 
assessment tool – that does not assume considerable expert knowledge from the person or 
persons using it like the World Health Organization’s risk assessment tool for communicable 
diseases in humanitarian emergencies does (52, 53) – can be seen as an attempt to capture 
some of the main risk factors for commucnaibel disease outbreaks in such settings.  
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